For the sample period of 1965-1992 , Kortum and Lerner (2000 …nd that venture capital ("VC") investment has a positive impact on patent counts at the industry level, and that this impact is larger than that of R&D expenditures. We con…rm that this positive impact continued to be present and became even stronger in late 1990s during which VC industry experienced an unprecedented growth. We then proceed to study whether this positive impact of VC is also present on productivity growth, which is a measure of innovation alternative to patent counts. Unlike the impact on patent counts, we do not …nd that VC investment a¤ects total factor productivity growth. We do …nd that VC investment is positively associated with labor productivity but this positive impact is originated from the technology substitution from labor to other productive inputs such as energy and material. Therefore, our …nding suggests that, at the industry level, VC investment increases the patent propensity but may not necessarily improve the productive e¢ ciency. Various interpretations are o¤ered as to why this may be the case.
Introduction
Using industry level data, Kortum and Lerner (2000) …nd that venture capital ("VC") investments are more e¤ective than R&D in generating patents, and conclude that "While the ratio of VC to R&D averaged less than 3% from 1983-1992, our estimates suggest that VC may have accounted for 8% of industrial innovations in that period." It is worthwhile to re-examine this claim for the following two reasons. First, the U.S. VC industry experienced an explosive growth during late 1990s that Kortum and Lerner (2000) did not include in their sample. Given that some characterize this period as NASDAQ bubble (e.g. Shiller, 2000; Ofek and Richardson, 2003) , it is interesting to study whether VC investment during this "bubble" period continued to be as productive in generating patents as before. Second, measuring technological innovation is a di¢ cult task 1 and such a task would better be done from multiple perspectives, instead of using patent only. Reinforcing our concern, many authors recently raised questions as to the use of patents as a measure of innovation.
For instance, Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) document how recent changes in patenting -an institutional process that was created to nurture innovation -have wreaked havoc on innovators, businesses, and economic productivity. Allison et al. (2003) claim that many patents are not worth enforcing because the inventions they cover turn out to be worthless.
In this paper, we begin with extending the sample period to 2001 in order to study the impact of VC investment on innovations during the NASDAQ bubble period. This extension presented two challenges. First, Venture Economics data that Kortum and Lerner (2000) use sparsely record SIC codes of VC-backed companies after 1992. Therefore, we handcollect the information, and for the observations with which we cannot determine SIC codes, we assign the weights for each SIC code using the bridge table between SIC and VEIC we develop. Second, the NBER manufacturing 1 Acs and Audretsch (2005) summarize measures of technological change as (1) a measure of the inputs into the innovative process, such as R&D expenditures; (2) an intermediate output, such as the number of inventions which have been patented; or (3) direct measure of innovative output (such as productivity growth). 1 database that contains comprehensive productivity information was discontinued in 1997, and we extend this database by gathering information from multiple sources, in the same way as the NBER database was constructed. 2 Our …nal data consist of an annual panel of nineteen U.S. manufacturing industries between 1968 and 2001.
To maintain the comparability of our work against Kortum and Lerner, we adopt the same empirical model as theirs, which is speci…ed as a linearized patent production function with two inputs, namely, R&D and VC investment. To lessen the bias caused by omitting unobservable technological opportunity from the regressions, instrumental variables are used.
Con…rming the results of Kortum and Lerner (2000) , we …nd that VC investment continued to be a highly e¤ective driver of patent activities even during late 1990s. Further, the relative power of VC investment to R&D in explaining patent counts increases by including this period, suggesting that VC money during this period was not necessarily invested to support less "innovative" businesses than during other periods. Our result contrasts with Gompers and Lerner (2003) . Studying the same sample as Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Gompers and Lerner (2003) …nd that the relative power of VC investment to R&D in explaining patent counts decreases during the boom periods in which the amount of VC investment is high.
We then proceed to use, instead of patent counts, total factor productivity ("TFP") growth and labor productivity growth to see whether the results using patents also hold for these alternative measures of innovations. Unlike the results on patent, we do not …nd that VC investment signi…cantly and positively a¤ects TFP growth. We do …nd that VC investment positively a¤ects labor productivity growth. Nevertheless, this positive impact is due to the technology substitution using more energy and material and less labor in VC-intensive industries. In summary, our empir-ical results suggest a possibility that VC investment does increase patent propensity but may not necessarily increase TFP -a classic measure of innovation.
We examine the possibility that VC investment may motivate established …rms to strategically patent low-quality innovations. We do not …nd that the quality of patents owned by established …rms decline as VC investment increases. Instead, we …nd that the "originality" of these patents is positively related with VC investment. Simply speaking, the patent originality measure is the breadth of knowledge on which the patent is based. Therefore, our …nding suggests that established …rms draw their knowledge from a broader source when their industries are experiencing high VC activity. Our …nding is related with Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) who …nd that established …rms may not enjoy attractive …nancial returns from their corporate venture programs but may bene…t by accessing new technology through their portfolio …rms and broadening their knowledge bases, which are re ‡ected into the subsequent increase in patenting of the established …rms.
Similar to this paper, many authors study the impact of VC investment on innovation. 3 In addition to the aforementioned …nding at the industry level, Kortum and Lerner (2000) …nd that patents granted to VC-backed companies are cited more often than other patents, suggesting that VC-backed companies are engaged in important innovative activities. Hellmann and Puri (2000) …nd that VC-backed …rms follow more innovative strategies than non-VC-backed …rms. Using German data, Tykova (2000) …nds the positive relation between VC investment and patent application, similar to Kortum and Lerner (2000) . One problem of these results is that they do not distinguish which way the causality runs. Does VC investment makes the invested …rms innovative, or do innovative …rms receive VC investment?
A few paper address this causality issue by studying innovative activities after VC investments.
Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998), who studied causes of biotechnology start-up …rms. Interestingly, they …nd that controlling for the presence of local star scientists the historical size of VC market negatively a¤ects the rate of biotechnology start-up. Katila and Shane (2005) study whether licensed MIT patents are commercialized. They …nd that the patents are more likely to be commercialized if the licensee …rms are in the industry with high VC investment. Nevertheless, puzzlingly they …nd that this e¤ect exists only for established …rms but not for new …rms. Studying the sample of German …rms, Engel and Keilbach (2007) examine whether …rms with patents attract VC investment or VC investment aids …rms to patent in the future. By …nding twin …rms, one of which is VC-funded and the other is not, they report that VC-funded …rms register more patents than their twins before receiving VC investment, whereas this tendency disappears after the investment is made. Therefore, this result suggests that patents stimulate VC investment but not the other way around. Studying the sample of …rms that went to public in the Italian Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2004, Caselli, Gatti and Perrini (2009) …nd the same result as Engel and Keilbach. 4 As with this paper, a few papers study the impact of VC investment on TFP growth. Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2004) …nd that VC investment enhances both absorptive capacity and productivity more than R&D does for the country level panel data. Tang and Chyi (2008) …nd that through its role of an internal di¤usion channel of knowledge, VC industry promotes TFP growth in manufacturing industries in Taiwan. Nevertheless, using VAR for the U.S. manufacturing industry data, Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) …nd that the correlation between TFP and VC investment may be driven by the opposite causality -productivity growth drives VC investment. Studying a sample of VC-backed manufacturing …rms that appear in the Census data, Chemmanur, Krishnan and Nandy (2011) …nd that VC-backed …rms have higher TFP than non-VC-backed …rms at the time of initial VC funding as well as experience a higher TFP growth than non-VC-backed …rms after VC funding.
Organization of the Paper The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in this paper. The details in constructing new data sets are also discussed. Section 3 presents the results of empirical analyses. Section 4 discusses and studies a possible impact of VC investment on patent propensity. Section 5 concludes. For simplicity, in what follows, we refer to Kortum and Lerner (2000) as "KL."
Data Description
In this section, we describe how we construct the data set for our empirical analysis. Our data are annual and consist of VC disbursement, R&D expenditures, patent count, and productivity growth. Each item is aggregated to 19 U.S. manufacturing industries that roughly correspond to 2-digit SIC codes (see Table 2 for details) and the sample period is from 1968 to 2001. 5 There are two major challenges in assembling this data set. The …rst challenge is concordance between the VC data and the TFP data. The second challenge is extending the TFP data beyond the NBER coverage.
Data Sources
The data analyzed in this paper come from the following four main sources: VentureXpert, Bertelsman, Becker, and Gray's NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database ("the NBER productivity database"), the NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File ("the NBER patent database"), and Funds 5 There are two di¤erences in the sample coverage between this paper and KL. First, the sample period of KL starts three years earlier than ours. This is because computation of our TFP growth requires the data on employees' social security contribution and fringe bene…t, which is not available before 1968. Second, we do not include "Other manufacturing," which exists in KL. The reason why we do not include this industry stems from the transition from SIC to NAICS in 1997. "Other manufacturing" includes SIC 27 (Printing and Publishing), which was excluded from the manufacturing industries under NAICS. As a result, Annual Survey of Manufacturers stopped collecting data in this sector, and we were not able to extend the productivity series in "other manufacturing" beyond 1997.
for Industrial R&D Performance, by industry and by size of company: 1953-98 from National Science Foundation ("the R&D database").
VentureXpert is a proprietary database of Venture Economics, which is a division of Thomson Financial. Venture Economics receives quarterly reports from VC organizations and from major institutional investors on their portfolio holdings and, in exchange, provides summary data on investments and returns. VentureXpert reports daily VC investment data from 1960 to date.
VentureXpert records SIC codes of VC-backed …rms fairly well up to 1992, but only sparsely after 1992. We therefore gather this SIC information in the way described later.
The NBER productivity database draws original data from the Bureau of Census and contains productivity related variables for all manufacturing industries at the SIC 4-digit level. 6 The data are annual, start from 1958 and end in as early as 1996. We improve the NBER productivity database by adding the employer's social security contribution and fringe bene…t to payroll. These two items consist a signi…cant portion of employers'labor cost, and it's importance has grown over the last two decades. For instance, they accounted for 10.8% of total payroll in 1968 and grew to 21% in 2001. Therefore, if we would ignore these two labor cost items, we would signi…cantly underestimate labor shares and would likely underestimate productivity growth, because labor input growth is slower than growth of other inputs. In order to re ‡ect the impact of rapid increases of VC investment in the recent years into our analysis, we extend the NBER productivity database up to 2001 in the method described in Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) . Extensive productivity data are available only in this database and it covers only manufacturing. Thus, we limit our scope to manufacturing industries.
The NBER patent database and its extension contain 7 the information of utility patents granted 6 Bartelsman and Gray (1996) give detailed descriptions about this NBER manufacturing database. 7 The extension is downloadable from the Bronwyn Hall's website (http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/bhdata.html). This extension has the primary international classi…cation which is not present in the original NBER patent database. We compile the patent data by SIC code using the concordance between the primary international classi…cation 6 at U.S. patent and trademark o¢ ce ("USPTO") from 1963 to 2002. 8 For our empirical analysis, we sort the patent data by year of application instead by year of grant. The NBER patent database and its extension do not cover all patents applied between 1963 and 2001 because it is customary to take more than a year before a patent is granted. Therefore, we also extract updated data from the patent bibliographic raw …les at USPTO. 9 The R&D database contains annual spending of R&D sorted by industry and by source of funding. The industry classi…cation scheme roughly corresponds to the SIC 2-digit level. As the R&D database is not available in a …ner industry classi…cation, we are not able to go into …ner classi…cations of industry. As KL do, we interpolate if numbers are missing due to the NSF's undisclosure policy.
Concordance
One complication involved in combining VentureXpert and the NBER database is industry concordance. VentureXpert has the data item called SIPC that records the primary 4- Table 2 . Hereafter, we call this industry classi…cation system "KL classi…cation."The NBER productivity database records data at the SIC 4-digit level that is …ner than KL classi…cation. We aggregate both TFP growth and labor productivity growth by averaging corresponding 4-digit …gures weighted by value added. To construct VC investment data along with KL classi…cation, we …rst …ll the missing records of SIC using the SDC Platinum
Global New Issue and CRSP through CUSIP match. We …nd the primary 4-digit SIC codes of the companies involved in 3,138 deals in this way. We then resort to handcollecting this data item.
As our focus is on the manufacturing industries, we …rst exclude VC deals apparently involving non-manufacturing …rms. To be concrete, we focus our handcollection e¤ort on the observations whose VEIC are ever recorded together with the SIC codes 2000-3999 (manufacturing) in the entire VentureXpert database. We then use D&B Million Dollar Database and the business description written in VentureXpert to …ll in SIC code. We handcollect the information for additional 4,353
observations. 10 Then, we divide the data into two groups: the data points with which SIC codes are recorded and the ones with which SIC codes are not recorded. If the SIC code is recorded, we converted the SIC code into a KL classi…cation code using the concordance given in Table 2 . Subsequently we assign 100% of investment amount of the record to the KL classi…cation code into which the original SIC code was converted. If the SIC code is not recorded, the recorded VEIC is used to distribute the investment amount into SIC-based industries. The distribution rule is constructed from the data records with SIC codes and thereby KL classi…cation assigned in the way described Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis. All …gures are computed from the panel of 19 manufacturing industries. Table 2 shows VC investment classi…ed into each industry using the method described above.
Descriptive Statistics
It is easy to observe that VC investments are clustered. In particular, O¢ ce and computing machines (KL 13), Communication and electronics (KL 15), and Professional and scienti…c instruments (KL 19) account for two thirds of the total VC investment in manufacturing industries to date. One can also see that VC investment in O¢ ce and computing machines and also Communication and electronic is not only large in absolute term but also in relative to R&D expenditures.
Both TFP growth and labor productivity growth in this sector are also high. However, there is 9 one caveat for interpreting these high numbers. One of the biggest problems to measure innovation by TFP growth is a di¢ culty in measuring quality improvement. Unlike cost-reducing innovation, to identify quality improvement requires detailed knowledge in assessing and measuring product quality. For this reason, TFP growth associated with quality improvement is infrequently incorporated. Computer related industries are rare ones that incorporate this TFP growth due to quality improvement more accurately than other industries. In 1980s, the Bureau of Census conducted the measurement of quality change in those industries with help of IBM. This is the only signi…cant attempt made by the Bureau. For this reason, industries other than computer related ones may not exhibit substantial quality improvement in their TFP growth …gure and it may be underrepresented. Table 3 shows that VC investment in the U.S. manufacturing industry has dramatically grown during the last four decades. The amount of investment in the recent few years is about 100 times as much as the one in 1968-70. Notably, stimulated by a sequence of regulatory changes favorable to VC, the investment amount signi…cantly increased from 1970s to 1980s. These changes involve the clari…cation of ERISA prudent man rule 11 , the reduction of capital gains tax rate 12 , and the introduction of Bayh-Dole Act 13 that facilitated technology transfers from universities to private sectors. The whole VC industry experienced a downturn in the early 1990s due to asset quality problems of pension funds. Those funds were pulled out from private equity investments to reduce riskiness of their portfolios. Pension funds are main …nancing sources for U.S. venture capitalists and this assets reallocation by pension funds severely hit venture capitalists. Table 3 also shows the rapid growth of patenting activities in 1990s, as documented by Kortum and Lerner (1998) .
Compared to the data used by KL, our VC investment …gures are systematically larger except the year 1976, for which the number of …rms receiving VC funding is 47 in KL (Table 1) and 44 in our sample (Table 3 ). This discrepancy may happen because Venture Economics back…lls their database. If so, our results will be more subject to a survivorship bias than KL. This survivorship bias is likely to in ‡ate the positive impact of VC investment on innovations because a higher fraction of older data points is investment made by successful and surviving VC funds, and their investments are likely to be higher quality than average. As we discuss later, our estimated coe¢ cients on VC investment are higher than KL, and consistent with this back…lling story. Table 4 shows the correlation between variables. Our TFP growth taking account for employers' social security contribution and bene…ts are highly correlated with the NBER TFP growth.
Both early-stage and total VC investments are positively and signi…cantly correlated with all …ve measures of innovation (NBER TFP growth, our TFP growth, labor productivity growth, and production labor productivity growth, and patent) as expected. Privately-funded R&D is also signi…cantly related with these measures of innovation. Nevertheless, federally-funded R&D is not signi…cantly related with any measures of innovation. This low correlation may be due to the following two reasons. First, federally sponsored research projects are more basic than applied in their natures, and therefore it takes long for the bene…ts of such research to be realized. Second, federally sponsored projects may have commercial values lower than that of company sponsored projects, as federal agencies have the motives di¤erent from pro…t-seeking. And therefore, innovations generated by federal funds may be less commercialized (including the process to patent innovations) than those generated by company funds.
3 Empirical Methods and Results
In this section, we present the methods and results of our empirical analysis. Underlying methods used here are the same as the instrumental variables method in KL. KL assume that the patent production function is of the form P it = (R it + bV it ) = u it ; where subscripts i and t denote industry and time, respectively, P is patent count, R is R&D expenditure, V is VC investment, and u is unobservable technological opportunities. KL estimate that is close to one and then focus on the linearized speci…cation
We also employ this linear speci…cation. Similar to KL, our focus is b, which measures the power of VC investment in increasing innovation relative to that of R&D expenditures. Note that is a return-to-scale parameter and it should theoretically be positive. If u it is correlated with observable explanatory variables, OLS estimate of coe¢ cients on these variables are biased. Following KL, we use gross industry product as an instrument for R it and, as the instrument for V it =R it ; the variable that is equal to zero before 1979 and from 1979 equal to the average V it =R it over the period of 1968-1975 or 1968-1978 . The latter instrument is motivated by the clari…cation of ERISA prudent man rule described in the previous section.
For all regressions presented below, we control for federally-funded industrial R&D, industry dummies and year (or period) dummies. We are also aware that both industry-and time-dimensions are not large in our data set: the sample size of our entire sample is # findustriesg # fyearsg = 19 34 = 646. Under this circumstance, it is unclear whether a particular covariance estimate provides a satisfactory approximation to its true value. Then, to conduct conservative inference, we calculate standard errors in two alternative ways for each parameter estimate and utilize them complementarily. As in KL, standard errors are computed based on the autocorrelationconsistent covariance estimator with maximum of three lags by Newey and West (1987) . Besides, we obtain standard errors from the two-way cluster-robust covariance estimator across industry and time by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) and Thompson (2011) . Tables 5-9 report the former in parentheses and the latter in brackets.
Patent Results
We begin with replicating the KL's instrumental variable regression models over the extended sample period. Our results are summarized in Table 5 . In Panel A, we …x the coe¢ cient on ln R it to either 0.2 or 0.5, instead of estimating it. This is to lessen the concern that gross industry product may not be a good instrument. In Panel B, we instrument R it by gross industry product. In the …rst four columns of Panel B, the cuto¤ year for the instrument for the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D is 1979 as described above. In the next four columns, the cuto¤ year is changed to 1976. For all speci…cations, we run the same regression for the two sample periods, 1968-2001 and 1968-1992.
The latter sample period is almost identical to that of KL and the results of this restricted sample can help us to understand why our results are quantitatively di¤erent from KL as described below.
In sum, our results con…rm that the KL's …ndings are robust to including the NASDAQ bubble period in the sample. In all speci…cations, the estimated coe¢ cients on privately-funded R&D and the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D are both positive and signi…cant, the same as the KL's …ndings. Interestingly, our estimated coe¢ cients on the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D as well as on privately-funded R&D are substantially smaller when we drop 1993-2001 from our sample period. This indicates that the positive impact of VC investment on patent counts became larger in 1990s as well as the patent production function became less subject to decreasing return to scale.
Even after we restrict our sample period to 1968-1992, our estimated coe¢ cients are all substantially bigger than those found in KL. This di¤erence is pronounced if we use the number of …rms receiving VC funding instead of venture disbursements. For instance, when they …x the coe¢ cient 13 on privately-funded R&D to 0.5, which corresponds to the right half of Panel A in our Table 5, KL's estimated coe¢ cients on the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D are 2.51 and 1.72, while our estimates are 10.25 and 2.10. 14 The survivorship bias our data are subject to may explain why our coe¢ cients are bigger than theirs.
TFP Results
We now study the impact of VC investment on productivity growth. Instead of patent counts, we use TFP growth as a dependent variable expressed in percentage. Our results are presented in Table 6 . The …rst two columns contain the result using OLS without instrumental variables. The third and fourth columns contain the results under the same speci…cation as the patent regression instrumenting both privately-funded R&D and the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D, in the same manner as KL. The estimated coe¢ cients on the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D are all positive in these …rst four regressions. Nevertheless, the standard errors of these coe¢ cients are also large and it is hard to …nd evidence against the hypothesis that the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D does not a¤ect TFP growth.
To examine whether this insigni…cance result is robust, we include three additional control variables. First, we control for industry capacity utilization. Our method of estimating TFP assumes that industry capacity, especially capital, is fully utilized. This assumption is not satis…ed in reality due to the adjustment costs of capital. During industry downturns, capital is underutilized and our method overestimates the amount of capital used as productive input. To circumvent this problem, we control for capacity utilization in our regressions. 15 Second, we control for age of 1 4 In unreported regressions, we have examined whether our results are robust to using either early-stage or latestage only VC investment, lagging the explanatory variables, to splitting the sample into VC-intensive industries (Computer and Communication Equipment) and others, and to splitting the sample into boom and bust period. We have obtained qualitatively very similar results. 1 5 We obtain capacity utilization data from Federal Reserve Board of Governors (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/).
Our capacity utilization is the annual average of monthly capacity utilization which is computed as output index divided by capacity index. 14 capital. 16 Age of capital may a¤ect TFP growth through either mismeasurement of capital and learning cost associated with introduction of new capital investments. When new equipment is introduced, its quality tends to be higher than that of old equipment. Nevertheless, the data may not be able to pick up this quality improvement and therefore may underestimate the amount of new equipment investment. As a consequence, we observe a faster TFP growth when new equipment investment is high and age of capital declines (Nelson, 1964) Third, we control for industry shipment. This speci…cation incorporates the observation of a lower return to R&D seen in a larger …rm (Adams and Ja¤e, 1996) .
Columns 5-12 in Table 6 presents the results controlling for the three aforementioned variables.
Both privately-funded industrial R&D and the ratio of VC and privately-funded industrial R&D are instrumented. Similar to the results without the three control variables, the estimated coe¢ cients on the ratio of VC are signi…cant at the 5% level in none of these regressions. In summary, we therefore do not …nd a support for the positive impact of VC on TFP growth. 17 
Labor Productivity Growth Results
We also run the same regressions as those for TFP growth, using labor productivity growth as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 7 . Di¤erent from the results of TFP, the estimated coe¢ cients on the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D are positive for all and 5% signi…cant for roughly a half of the instrumental variable regressions.
One may argue that labor productivity growth is a better measure of innovation than TFP growth, because the measurement of labor productivity does not require the measurement of nonlabor input such as capital, material and energy. In particular, the measurement of capital and material is di¢ cult due to quality heterogeneity and therefore the estimates of TFP heavily depends on the measurement method of capital and material. Nevertheless, labor productivity growth as a measure of innovation is also subject to important criticisms. Unlike TFP, labor productivity is only a partial measure of productivity. Even if there is no improvement in productive e¢ ciency, labor productivity increases when other productive inputs are used more relative to labor input. In other words, for labor productivity to be a valid measure of technological progress, the proportion of each productive input needs to remain constant.
To examine whether this restriction is satis…ed, we regress the growth of the other inputs relative to the growth of labor input. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 8 . For every speci…cation, the estimated coe¢ cients on the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D are positive, and they are signi…cant when the dependent variable is either the relative growth of energy or non-energy material. In particular, for the latter case, 5% signi…cance is obtained regardless of the choice of the de…nition of VC investment or the standard error formula. These results con…rm our concern that the positive impact of VC investment on labor productivity just found is driven by substitutions of input factors away from labor. Interestingly, the results also show that privately-funded R&D is positively and signi…cantly related with the technology substitution away from labor towards non-energy material.
Why do …rms in VC-intensive industries tend to move towards less labor-intensive technology?
One reason may have to do with a tougher corporate governance mechanism that venture capitalists usually bring in, as documented by Hochberg (2012) . She …nds that VC-backed …rms adopt a better corporate governance structure than non VC-backed …rms. Such strong governance presumably discourages incumbent management from setting up the entrenchment schemes including strong protection of own employees. 18 Another reason why …rms in VC-intensive industries tend to move towards less labor-intensive technology may be to boost share prices. Financial analysts sometimes look at labor productivity at …rm level to assess the …rm's ability to generate cash ‡ows in the future. Knowing this, new …rms with a big …nancial appetite due to growth opportunities such as VC-backed …rms may switch to less labor-intensive technology, increase labor-productivity, and 
Why Does VC Investment Increase Patent Propensity?
Our results so far strongly suggest that VC investment increases patent counts but does not necessarily improve productive e¢ ciency of U.S. manufacturing industries. In other words, VC investment appears to encourage the …rms to patent their existing technology. Given that VC money is invested in new …rms but not in established …rms, there are a few reasons why VC money may increase the patent propensity of the industry. 19 
VC Investment May Increase Defensive Patents by Established Firms
First, VC-backing strengthens the competitiveness of new …rms and this competitive pressure from these new …rms may increase the patent propensity of established …rms. These established …rms may patent their inventions in order to block other …rms from using them, even though patenting …rms themselves never commercialize the patented inventions (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) . Supporting 1 9 For the sample of Silicon Valley …rms, Hellmann and Puri (2000) …nd that VC-backed …rms are often start-ups (2 years old on average). There are several explanations why venture capitalists are speci…cally catered to start-up …rms. First, a venture capitalist typically specializes in a narrow set of businesses and therefore may have an advantage in evaluating the businesses accurately. This accurate evaluation may lessen the cost associated with asymmetric information (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Chan, 1983) . Second, VC may have a high ‡exibility in …nancial instruments because VC industries are relatively free from regulations. The …nancial instrument most commonly used by VC is convertible debts. Such equity instruments are not allowed for banks for instance. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) show how convertible debts can lessen the entrepreneur's incentive to engage in "window dressing"or short-termism. Third, not only …nancing portfolio …rms, VC often supplies the …rms with other resources essential to new …rms. Those resources consist of legal and marketing expertise and are invaluable for new …rms whose assets typically consist of their blueprints of prospective projects alone. New …rms typically lack many types of resources that large …rms internalize by taking advantage of their scale economy and business history. For instance, Lerner (1995) …nds that VC-backed …rms are more likely to make lawsuits related to trade secrecy infringement and suggests that venture capitalists actively help portfolio …rms with these legal issues. Hellmann and Puri (2000) …nd that VC-backed …rms can bring their products to the market faster than other non-VC-backed …rms can, suggesting that venture capitalists can help new …rms to …nd marketing channels and customers. the importance of this blocking motive, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) report that 82% of their respondents mention the blocking motive as one of their reasons to apply for patents and that this motive is second only to the motive of preventing copying (96%). The blocking motive is presumably stronger and established …rms tend to patent more, when the threat of competition from start-ups becomes signi…cant due to supports from venture capitalists.
We now attempt to test whether VC investment encourages established …rms to patent for blocking motives. We hypothesize that patents with blocking motives are of lower quality than patents to be commercialized. With this hypothesis, it is anticipated that VC investment should cause the quality deterioration of patents held by established …rms. Measuring the quality of patents is a challenging task, however, in particular due to our focus on the recent sample period that prohibits us from using the patent quality measures such as the number of citation that a patent received and the occurrence of patent renewal. 20 Therefore, we resort to the measures of patent quality which are all available at the time of patent application. The …rst measure is the number of citations that the patent makes. The second measure is the "number of claims" that specify in detail the "components" or building blocks of the patented invention. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) …nd that patents with higher number of claims are more likely to be litigated, indicating that these patents are more valuable. The third measure is "originality" that measures the technological breadth of the patents being cited. In particular, originality is computed as the Her…ndahl index of cited patents, each of which is classi…ed according to the U.S. patent class.
Originality measure is related to the diversity of the knowledge on which the patent is based. The fourth measure is the average age of patents cited. The younger the age of patents cited, the more recent the knowledge on which the patent is based. Gonzalez (2006) reports that this recency of knowledge is positively related with the radicalness of memory chip inventions.
Hall, Ja¤e, and Trajtenberg (2001) report that the raw number of these quality measures vary across industry and time due to change in institutional constraints. As a result, the comparison of these raw numbers over di¤erent time periods or industries are not likely to be meaningful. We therefore subset patent observations by U.S. patent class and application year, compute median values of each quality measures for each subset, and classify each patent as either above-or belowaverage quality against the U.S. patent class-application year median of the corresponding subset.
For patent granted to established …rms, we then compute the ratio of below-average quality patent against above-average quality patent. Here, we de…ne established …rms as patent holders that appear in 1989 Compustat. Therefore, if this ratio increases over time, it indicates the quality deterioration of patent held by established …rms relative to those held by non-established …rms, and vice versa.
We regress this ratio under the four di¤erent patent quality measures using the empirical model of KL. Our results are summarized in Table 9 . Among all four measures, only the results using the originality measure are signi…cant, and we therefore focus on these results. Note that the dependent variable is the ratio of patent with below-average originality in the established …rms' patents. Therefore, the negative estimated coe¢ cients on the ratio of VC and privately-funded R&D implies that the originality of patents held by the established …rms improves relative to non-public …rms when VC investment is high. This contradicts the blocking hypothesis that VC investment should be positively related to the quality deterioration of patents held by established …rms.
VC Funding Favors New Firms That Have Higher Patent Propensity than Established Firms
Second, VC investments are geared towards start-up …rms and these …rms presumably have a higher patent propensity than established …rms. Start-ups may use patents more often than established 20 …rms as a mean to appropriate returns to innovation. Levin et al. (1987) …nd that large …rms generally rate patents as less e¤ective mechanisms of appropriation than the other means such as secrecy, lead time, and sales or service e¤orts. Nevertheless, start-ups typically do not have any of these appropriation vehicles that established …rms do because start-ups do not own their manufacturing and marketing capacities. Thus, these …rms may use patents more often than established …rms. Supporting this di¤erence in patent propensity, Table 2 of Hall and Ziedonis (2001) report that design …rms, specializing in product innovation in the US semiconductor industry have a higher propensity to patent than ones with manufacturing capacities. Using the survey of U.S. manufacturing …rms, Table 7 of Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) also …nd that propensity to patent process innovations is negatively related with the presence of complementary sales and service assets, which new …rms may not be able to a¤ord.
Patent Propensity of New Firms Increases in Anticipation of VC Funding
Third, when …nancing becomes more available, new …rms'patent propensity may increase because patents are an important means of obtaining funding. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) …nd that semiconductor …rms often cite patents as a way to secure …nancing when the …rms are young. Ueda (2004) also suggests that …rms seeking for VC investment may have an increased incentive to patent their innovations, to lessen the VC's threat to expropriate their innovations.
Concluding Remarks
This paper asks the following questions. First, did VC investment continue to be a highly e¤ective driver of patent activities during the explosive VC boom in late 1990s? Second, does VC money spur industrial innovation or patents? The answer to the …rst question is yes. By extending the sample period up until 2001, we recon…rm the results of KL. We …nd that VC investments are more e¤ective than R&D in generating patents and its e¤ect became stronger during the extended 21 period. The answer to the second question is that VC money spurs patents but not necessarily industrial innovation. In particular, we …nd that VC investment is not signi…cantly related with TFP growth; labor productivity is positively and signi…cantly related with VC investment. Nevertheless, this positive relation is driven by the impact of VC investment on the substitution of energy and non-energy material against labor. This labor saving behavior in VC intensive industries may be driven by strong corporate governance by venture capitalists or by …rms'desire to boost labor productivity and also stock prices. We also speculate that availability of VC may increases the patent propensity of new …rms andnor the industry average patent propensity because VC stimulates new …rm startups. Overall, our results suggest that the impact of VC investment is complex and a further examination is needed to understand what VC investment does for innovation. Table   Notes : Both TFP Growth and NBER TFP Growth are computed as output growth minus the weighted sum of the five production factors (non-production employment, production work hour, capital, energy, and non-energy material). For the computation of TFP Growth, we include benefits such as pension contribution to obtain the weights for each factor growth. Benefits are not included when computing the weights for NBER TFP Growth. Labor Productivity Growth is output growth minus growth of total employment. Production Labor Productivity Growth is output growth minus growth of production work hours. P-values for the null of no correlation are presented in parentheses. For the first two columns of each panel, the average is computed over the period from 1968 to 1978, and for the second two columns, the average is computed over the period from 1968 to 1975. Year and industry dummy variables are included in all regressions. Figures in parentheses and brackets are standard errors based on the Newey-West autocorrelation-consistent covariance estimator (with a maximum of three lags) and those on the two-way cluster-robust covariance estimator across industry and time, respectively. Standard errors for the parameter b are calculated using the delta method. The 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. In all regressions, we present two measures of the goodness of fit: the overall R 2 and R 2 when compared against a regression with year and industry dummy variables only, where the latter is computed as (Dummy_only SSR -SSR) / Dummy_only SSR, and SSR refers to the sum of squared residuals of the various regressions. Notes: The instrument for privately funded industrial R&D is gross industry product and the instrument for the ratio of VC to privately funded R&D is the interaction of ERISA dummy variable with average of venture funding relative to corporate R&D over the period of 1968-1978. Capacity utilization is the annual average of monthly capacity utilization which is computed as output index divided by capacity index.
Figures in parentheses and brackets are standard errors based on the Newey-West autocorrelation-consistent covariance estimator (with a maximum of three lags) and those on the two-way cluster-robust covariance estimator across industry and time, respectively. Standard errors for the parameter b are calculated using the delta method. The 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. In all regressions, we present two measures of the goodness of fit: the overall R 2 and R 2 when compared against a regression with year and industry dummy variables only, where the latter is computed as (Dummy_only SSR -SSR) / Dummy_only SSR, and SSR refers to the sum of squared residuals of the various regressions. The sample period is from 1968 to 2001. 
Non-Energy Material/ Employment
Notes: The instrument for privately funded industrial R&D is gross industry product and the instrument for the ratio of VC to privately funded R&D is the interaction of ERISA dummy variable with average of venture funding relative to corporate R&D over the period of 1968-1978. Figures in parentheses and brackets are standard errors based on the Newey-West autocorrelation-consistent covariance estimator (with a maximum of three lags) and those on the two-way cluster-robust covariance estimator across industry and time, respectively. Standard errors for the parameter b are calculated using the delta method. The 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. In all regressions, we present two measures of the goodness of fit: the overall R 2 and R 2 when compared against a regression with year and industry dummy variables only, where the latter is computed as (Dummy_only SSR -SSR) / Dummy_only SSR, and SSR refers to the sum of squared residuals of the various regressions. Notes: The instrument for privately funded industrial R&D is gross industry product and the instrument for the ratio of VC to privately funded R&D is the interaction of ERISA dummy variable with average of venture funding relative to corporate R&D over the period of 1968-1978. Figures in parentheses and brackets are standard errors based on the Newey-West autocorrelation-consistent covariance estimator (with a maximum of three lags) and those on the two-way cluster-robust covariance estimator across industry and time, respectively. Standard errors for the parameter b are calculated using the delta method. The 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. In all regressions, we present two measures of the goodness of fit: the overall R 2 and R 2 when compared against a regression with year and industry dummy variables only, where the latter is computed as (Dummy_only SSR -SSR) / Dummy_only SSR, and SSR refers to the sum of squared residuals of the various regressions. The sample period is from 1976 to 2001.
that make belowaverage citations.
that make belowaverage claims.
with below-average originality. 
